

***The War At Home:
Race Violence in the Red Summer of 1919***

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*For God's sake arm. They are coming. We cannot hold them.
-Chicago Police officer, July 1919*

Introduction

As America emerged triumphantly from the international conflict of World War I, uncertainty reigned domestically. Without war contracts, many employees had no job-security, returning soldiers faced an uncertain job market, blacks did not know what their status would be, women fought for suffrage, and workers struck for wage increases and benefits. Tension filled the post-war years as racial and economic tensions increased. Indeed, in Chicago alone, laborers struck 139 times in 1919 (Tuttle 139), and 250,000 workers were on strike, threatened to strike, or were locked out (Tuttle 141). This situation needed only a spark to explode, which came on July 27th, 1919 when Eugene Williams drowned in Lake Michigan, sparking a race riot that injured over 500 people (Tuttle 6).

The Chicago Riot was not the summer's only confrontation between races though. In *Race Riots & Resistance*, Jan Voogd identified seven major riots during the Red Summer (Voogd 2). While these riots occurred from Washington DC to Oklahoma, in the North and the South, several characteristics tie the riots together. Millions of African-Americans¹ left the South for the seemingly unlimited stream of wartime jobs in the

¹ Among other terms, sources use "Negro" and "Colored" when referring to descendants of former slaves. Regardless of the 1919 usage, this paper will refer to those citizens as "African-Americans" or "Blacks" consistent with 2011 norms, except in direct quotations.

North. This flood of migrants created racial tension as blacks competed with whites for jobs, housing, and political power.

Chicago, which “More than any other northern city represented the top of the world” for black migrants fleeing the degrading sharecropping system of the Jim Crowe South, experienced the most dramatic influx, and the black population doubled from 54,000 to 100,000 during the war (Tuttle 76). However, extreme racial segregation confined the swelling black population to Chicago’s south side black belt, an already saturated area that could not adequately house the influx. Overcrowding forced blacks to expand into the hostile districts that abutted it on all sides, which caused friction with white residents who expressed racial hatred of blacks and feared decreasing property values. Thirteen bombs exploded in the six months preceding the riot, and the lack of police interest in investigating and preventing these crimes fostered distrust among the black population (Tuttle 158).

The Chicago Race Riot provides an effective window into post World War I American society. But significant debate exists over how to interpret the Red Summer, and where to place blame. William Tuttle’s definitive text, *Race Riot; Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919*, traces the riot’s origins to the Great Migration. He argued the influx of southern blacks prompted competition for political power, jobs, and housing, which in turned created the tension filled environment that fostered the riot. Jan Voogd’s argument in *Race Riots & Resistance* however has a psychological basis. She contends the war fostered a new set of acceptable norms that enabled hysterical white racism to manifest itself (Voogd 2). The war also altered gendered norms; men needed to reestablish their social position as “Bernice bobbed her hair and women worked to get

suffrage rights” (Voogd 32). The war did not change white norms only though, Voogd wrote, it “taught blacks to face a danger and see it through (Voogd 30),” and while she praised Tuttle’s definitive work she made sure to explain his account is not truly complete on its own. As opposed to a labor riot, military riot, or riot born out of political tension, Voogd labeled the Chicago riot as a “caste rupture,” that implied the riot was not an extreme, but rationale response to concrete factors, but a reshaping of moral and racial norms, brought on by the terrors of World War I (Voogd 118).

Analyzing these two schools of thought explains the roots of racial violence and domestic impact of an international war, especially a war fought for democracy in the face of inequality and discrimination at home. Whereas other cities attempted to cover up incidents of racial violence, the Chicago Commission on Race Relation’s (CCRR) comprehensive and public 600-page report left no stone unturned, gave no encouragement to whites who argued for stricter segregation, and offers historians far more evidence than available in other cities, providing a window into the past (Voogd 154).

The Chicago Race Riot

While officially open to whites and blacks, Chicago’s beaches operated under de-jure segregation, where whites and blacks had an unspoken understanding to swim separately. On July 27th 1919, five boys were playing on a raft that broke the invisible color line. A white man on shore threw rocks at the boys, and Eugene Williams drowned, although the exact circumstances remain unclear. Tuttle claims “A rock struck him...on the...forehead” and blood bubbled up around Williams as he sank into Lake Michigan (Tuttle 6). The official Coroner’s jury however concluded that no stone directly struck Williams, but the “death would not have occurred...had he not been

compelled to remain in the water because of stone-throwing until he became exhausted (Voogd 44).” Officer Callahan, the white police officer on the scene, refused to arrest the alleged rock thrower. Rumors flew, such as one that like one that claimed Callahan caused Williams’ death by preventing swimmers from rescuing him. A black crowd assembled at the beach, and when Callahan arrested a black man from the crowd, they mobbed the police officer, and the riot began (CCRR 1).

By the following evening, racial groups organized and “small mobs began systemically in various neighborhoods to terrorize and kill (CCRR 6).” Carloads of white gangs drove through the black belt firing indiscriminately. Armed white mobs also forayed into black neighborhoods and terrorized, stabbed, and beat blacks caught out in the open or on streetcars. A mob of 2000 whites for example disengaged a streetcar and pummeled John Mills to death (Tuttle 37). Blacks, who lost faith in the police department long before, armed themselves and used individual tactics like sniping against the gangs. The difference in tactics was substantial between individualized black responses and responses of whites, who resorted primarily to mob rule (Tuttle 34). Following the first several days of rioting, darkness descended on the black belt as the streetlights had been shot out. Abandoned cars and smoke littered the area, which ironically resembled to a war zone.

The extensive rioting would not have occurred without the aggression of Chicago’s “athletic” clubs. In fact, the CCRR wrote, “Had it not been for the activities of these gangs...it is doubtful the riot would have gone beyond the first clash (Tuttle 33).” Essentially gangs, these “clubs” were composed mainly of seventeen to twenty-one year old Irish descendants, who seized upon the first conflict to engage in lawless acts (CCRR

11). The most infamous was the Ragen Colts. The Colts felt increasingly threatened by blacks working in the stockyards, consolidating political power, and picnicking in Washington Park. As more blacks streamed into Chicago, the “Colts solidarity likewise intensified and with it their race hatred and violent behavior (Tuttle 236).” Ironically, in contrast to white perceptions of blacks as lawless, every gang who figured in the riot was white, and the CCRR wrote, “Negro hoodlums do not appear to form organized gangs so readily (CCRR 12).”

The Military and Police Responses

The Chicago Police Department completely failed to stop the rioting in an acceptable amount of time. According to the CCRR, the problem in the police department was understaffing, by approximately 1,000 officers (CCRR 33). “Dead tired, numerous police officers could not perform their duties properly,” wrote Tuttle (Tuttle 43). Closely following understaffing however was the black population’s total distrust of the police. When blacks approached Officer Callahan after Williams’ drowning, they knew better than to expect a fair response. Worse though, Chicago’s black population believed the police gave “aid and comfort to a certain element of violators of the law (Tuttle 158).” The repeated residential bombings brought only superficial police investigations, which spurred blacks to defend their own homes. This suspicion increased after the East St. Louis riots in May 1919 when police even aligned with whites to terrorize black citizens. As the weeks passed, “stories of alleged brutality of white officers studded practically every page of local news in the *Chicago Defender* (Tuttle 234).”

The police department made numerous tactical errors as well. Despite CPD Commander Garrity’s repeated claims of an undermanned force, he delayed requesting

militia reinforcement (CCRR 40). In another tactical blunder, Garrity stationed eighty percent of the entire police force in the black belt. This was particularly egregious because less than half of the total number of injuries reported occurred there (CCRR 38). The police occupation of the black belt left the city exposed to violence, which whites took note of. On the north side, a 5000-person mob roamed the streets hunting down blacks (Tuttle 50), and the violence even spread to Chicago's business district, where more than one hundred whites beat blacks (Tuttle 45).

The police response cannot be solely attributed to understaffing and fatigue however; blatantly racist actions occurred. The police for example, shot and killed seven black men but no whites. In perhaps the most horrific instance of police brutality, a police officer approached Horace Jennings, a wounded African-American lying in the street, and rather than help him, beat him unconscious (Tuttle 43). At the riot's onset, the police failed to arrest impartially, which further incited the black population throughout the riot. The white grand jury even agreed that the "Police were grossly unfair in making arrests...[they] shut their eyes to offenses committed by white men while they were very vigorous in getting all the colored men they could (CCRR 34)."

Governor Lowden finally called 6000 militia troops into the black belt on July 30th, after employers pressured the mayor and police fatigue became more obvious (Tuttle 54). Tuttle described the militia's conduct as "exemplary," said officers drew no color line, and used butts and bayonets as a last resort, in contrast to the police, who instructed deputies to shoot to kill any rioters (CCRR 43). The CCRR lavished further praise when they wrote that not even a single breach of discipline was reported to commanders, and African-Americans especially welcomed the troops. The commission

noted there was a significant difference between the militia and police responses, and harshly described how the militia commanders “had absolute control of the forces, knew at all times where and how many effective troops were available...were precise and prompt, and discipline was good (CCRR 42).” As further proof of police bias, most activities by the militia were against the gangs, which also demonstrates the extent to which police protected them.

The Great Migration as the Leading Cause of Racial Tension

“The influx of over 50,000 blacks in a brief period greatly complicated existing problems in Chicago. These...were primarily those of housing, politics, and labor...In 1919, the heightened problems of *housing, politics, and labor created such inflexible racial attitudes that the door to mutual racial understanding in Chicago was closed, and violence was bound to result.*” (Tuttle 107)²

As mentioned briefly before, Tuttle strongly advanced the argument that the race riot erupted out of tensions born of the Great Migration. Further beleaguering his point, he wrote, “As in the housing warfare, the animosities engendered by political conflict were, for the most part, an outcrop of the wartime migration (Tuttle 183).” Clearly, one cannot misunderstand Tuttle’s convictions, claims that Jan Voogd would later attempt to refute.

Southern blacks were drawn more to Chicago than to any other city, Chicago was as Tuttle wrote, a “synonym for the north,” symbolized by the Columbian Exposition, mass production industries, the rail network that stretched across the country, and massive mail order houses (Tuttle 76). Jobs were plentiful in Chicago, especially considering the steep-drop off in immigration and the four million men who entered the armed services. As a central hub in the nation’s rail system, Chicago was accessible to all, and opportunities were widely promoted, especially in the *Chicago Defender*, one of the nation’s first black owned newspapers. It printed that in Chicago, black children

² Emphasis added

enrolled in the same school as whites, didn't have to umble to no one, could register to vote, and there wasn't any "yes sir" or "no sir" (Tuttle 86).

The impact of labor in causing the riot is a disputed topic. The CCRR found race was "relatively unimportant" and Allan Spear consented, and wrote the "Riot had little to do with labor conditions (Tuttle 110)." These experts based their claims off the little violence in the stockyards, the greatest source of employment for black Chicagoans. But that is a poor proxy because black workers avoided the stockyards during the riot, and it fails to take into account the long history of racial discontent among unionized Chicagoans.

This discontent stemmed primarily from black resistance to organizing in the stockyards and history as strikebreakers. In 1894, 1903, 1904, and 1905 thousands of blacks stepped in after whites walked off the job, tying the black race to strikebreakers in the eyes of white workers (Tuttle 119). Throughout the strikes, whites terrorized black scabs as they entered plants and indeed, racial violence broke out in 1905 between two black strikebreakers and whites. So even before the Red Summer, labor tensions had turned violent (Tuttle 123).

These tensions resurfaced towards the end of the war. By then, around 10,000 blacks made up a quarter of the stockyard workforce. The war's end brought the end of government contracts and protections with them, endowing whites with an increasing sense of urgency (Tuttle 124). Indeed, employers hoped to break many unions after the war, so union's fears were founded in reality. But union leaders also feared "blacks would be pawns of employers in the future struggle," especially because blacks broke strikes in Chicago's hotels and other places during the war (Tuttle 128). On the other

hand however, blacks had legitimate reasons to fear unionization. They were the most expendable employees, and did not want to jeopardize their jobs by aggressively organizing. As a result, in July 1919 over ninety percent of white stockyard workers were unionized, but seventy five percent of blacks were not (Tuttle 142).

Deciphering the meaning of the difference in union rates is hardened because of varying white union claims. Unions kicked off a spirited organizing drive in June 1919 and claimed to include every race color creed and nationality. Organizers said “ain’t no Jim Crow cars here today, that’s what organization does (Tuttle 137).” However on the other hand, many white union men did not want to equate themselves with blacks, who they thought belonged at the bottom of the social ladder. Additionally, racism was rampant in the early 20th century labor movement, where Tuttle wrote union delegates frequently referred to blacks as “niggers,” despite claiming to promote equality for all (Tuttle 145). Naturally, blacks were aware of this and saw unions motivated by self-interest, not a higher ideal of brotherhood. And in fact Tuttle pointed out “Even blacks who valued the labor movement felt unions sacrificed the interests of blacks to pacify the racism of white members (Tuttle 147).”

Differing perceptions of unionization were more culturally based than racially based however. Migrant workers had not worked in factories before and believed employers were natural allies who provided security and opportunity. These migrants were the ones who drastically increased in numbers during the war. According to Booker T. Washington, the black worker “Did not understand and did not like an organization which seemed to be founded on a sort of impersonal enmity to the man by whom he is employed (Tuttle 150).”

Bolstering Tuttle's point that labor tension played a role in the riots was the scene in the stockyards the month before the riot. Racial feuding over unionization caused a walkout by whites, who were frustrated that they put in all the work, while blacks received as much. A black worker stabbed a white man on the floor (Tuttle 153), and in a contentious exchange another black worker yelled, "Fuck the union, what is the use of joining (Tuttle 153)?" In the stockyards, one of Chicago's largest employment sites especially for the working classes, these actions indubitably contributed to deep hatred between the races. In addition, it is hard to believe that employers frequently replacing striking whites with supposedly 'inferior' blacks did not cause resentment among the then-undermined whites. By the time the race riot broke out, whites had generalized their hatred of striking blacks into hatred of blacks in general, and the situation acted as a gas-filled room waiting for the spark.

The housing situation in Chicago, which of course was driven by wartime migration, made up the second crux of Tuttle's theory behind the race riot's causes. In addition to greatly contributing to tension, even hatred, between the races, African Americans, following their horribly unjust treatment at the hands of realtors and the police, lost faith in whites. On the other side, whites solidified and intensified their hatred and opposition to black citizens and saw black home ownership as literally a threat to their entire way of life. Black competition in the job market affected the usually male breadwinner, but black "invasion" of white blocks represented a threat to the entire family, and thus further intensified hatred between the two races.

Importantly, the Great Migration, while contributing drastically to the Black Belt did not expand its boundaries, it instead drastically increased density within the black

belt. Further worsening the situation, the war ceased new residential construction as materials were used for the war effort. As a result of skyrocketing demand and stagnant supply, rents increased 25% (Tuttle 164). Worse, the essentially unlimited demand meant landlords did not feel obligated to properly maintain their properties. Buildings fell into disrepair and landlords subdivided two-story homes into four two-room flats, many of which had no indoor plumbing, no doors, and unsteady floors (Garb 182). Syphilis, tuberculosis, pneumonia, and nephritis all had higher infection rates in the black belt than in the city at large, and the still-born birth rate was twice as high. While Chicago overall was one of the more sanitary cities in the country, the health statistics in the black belt equaled those in Bombay, India (Tuttle 164). With a living situation like this, blacks can hardly be blamed for seeking escape.

As historian Margaret Garb noted, “It was a physical impossibility for the [1919] black population to live in the space it occupied in 1915 (Garb 200).” Hemmed in on three sides by factories to the North, Irish neighborhoods to the West, and Lake Michigan to the East, blacks could only move south, into Hyde Park. White Hyde Park residents feared blacks would destroy any blocks they invaded, and intensely organized into neighborhood organizations that lobbied for racially restrictive covenants and actively discriminated against black purchasers. Means of resistance included violence, and by the late teens, violent attacks on black home owners was common, manifested primarily through repeated residential bombings, of which the police were unable to catch the perpetrators (Garb 192). Indeed, the CCRR found insufficient amounts of housing and poor quality were important factors in Chicago’s race problem (CCRR 3, 645). Chicago Urban League member T. Arnold Hill went further and said, “ the pressure on the city’s

housing market was ‘undoubtedly at the bottom’ of the ‘general feeling of unrest (Garb 200).’” Garb wrote that the CCRR repeatedly found “anger over a shortage of decent housing...*lay at the riot’s core* (Garb 199),”³ which further underscored Tuttle’s claim that the riot was an extreme response to tangible factors and effects of the Great Migration.

The Race Riot as a Response to Altered Norms caused by World War I

Historians like Tuttle and Garb emphasized the tangible causes of the Race Riot. They cited the number of migrants the black belt absorbed, the percentage increase in rent, labor statistics in the stockyards, and frequency of residential bombings as indicators of the riot’s causes. Jan Voogd however leads another school of thought, one that contends the riots stemmed from more psychological factors. Indeed, A.J. Williams-Myers, a Professor of Black Studies at the State University of New York said “Causes...like job competition, rapid urban growth, and migration only clutter the debate...acknowledging racism as the root cause of the violence creates the breakthrough necessary to elevate the discourse (Voogd 8).” Additionally, historians have not found a direct correspondence between public disorder and economic hardship, which does detract from claims that labor tensions coupled with returning veterans, sparked the riot (Voogd 8).

Both schools of thought credit the war with somehow affecting the riots, but in different ways. As demonstrated above, Tuttle is one of many who believe the war played a key role in attracting African Americans to the North by supplying war-contracts to big companies, while at the same time taking them away at the war’s close. Jan Voogd however, believes the war’s emotional and psychological effects triggered the

³ Emphasis added

race riots. She wrote the riots occurred “Because of a hysterical white racism that was able to manifest itself because of a unique confluence of factors,” including the unprecedented level of trauma generated by World War I participants, and the extreme nativism and patriotic fervor that emerged after the war (Voogd 2).

Voogd also points out a key difference between the Red Summer and other riots in that typically, riots are a way for “the voiceless to make desperate needs known (Voogd 1).” In the Red Summer, the opposite occurred and whites who held the power rioted. Voogd claims this was due to threats to masculine identity and the destabilization of American society because of the war. These claims are much more psychological than the fact based claims of Tuttle, but merit further exploration and shed more light into American society and race relations after the war.

Voogd wrote the riots occurred after a critical mass of Americans lost their moral bearings on account of the war, and were “Characterized by an inability of the part of the white mobs to differentiate between the illusion of the perceived threat from the black community and the reality that the feared threat did not exist (Voogd 14).” White males perceived a gendered threat towards their masculinity, brought on by expectations for social equality generated by black soldiers who fought for democracy (Voogd 22).

Voogd further emphasized the wars effect on psyche, not physical events. World War I naturally brought forth and increased enthusiasm, fervor, and patriotism, but after it ended the country was left with a reservoir of this excitement, which Voogd claims transformed into “increased nativism, racism, fear, suspicion, and economic uncertainty (Voogd 25).” In war, the once insane becomes commonplace, as norms shift to accept

ideas like the mass bombing of cities. These altered values had the potential to wreck devastation at home, which happened in the Red Summer (Voogd 33).

William Tuttle's commentary on the "New Negro" was his work's most significant mention of psychological causes of the riot. He discussed how returning black soldiers fought back, and hoped the US would fulfill the principle of equal rights. Voogd perceived the effect of the "New Negro" differently. She admits blacks brought broader expectations home from the war, but writes "To attribute the riots to this activism illogically misplaces the agency of violence (Voogd 138)." Indeed, citing black activism as a cause for white-led violence does seem counter-intuitive, and Voogd again presented her claim that hysterical white racist mobs were the "undeniable aggressors" and caused of the Red Summer riots (Voogd 138). Voogd continued her indirect assault of Tuttle's argument when wrote that white authorities tried to justify the riots when they "went to all sorts of lengths to establish causes, like overcrowding, job competition, and a lame legal system," all claims Tuttle made (Voogd 136).

Voogd closed by writing that disapproval by the non-hysterical public motivated authorities to more aggressively and equally enforce the laws. In the end, she drove home the point that war makes psychological changes in a society, and causes people to change long held beliefs. But World War I's abrupt ending left society in a state of disjuncture. "This inchoate stew of moral ambiguity, rather than any specific causes, or factors, or chain of events facilitated the epidemic of hysterical white mob violence (Voogd 162)." For Voogd, it was not housing segregation, or the impact of the Great Migration, but deep alterations in the social fabric that caused the eruption of violence now known as the Red Summer. This caused people who normally would have spoken

out to stand by as mobs viciously hunted down blacks. It is commonly accepted that war enforces both the unification and suppression of society. During World War I, America did come together during the war effort, but as the Red Summer shows, it was not without a cost.

Chicago, A Turning Point Among Turning Points

This paper numerously stated Chicago's race riot was different, a new kind of riot. On this point, both Tuttle and Voogd agreed that blacks fought back. Indeed despite white animosity towards Chicago's black belt, less than half the injuries occurred there. However Chicago's was not the only riot in which notable changes occurred. Sociologist Elliot Rudwick examined race riots in East St. Louis (1917), Chicago (1919) and Detroit (1943), and found numerous similarities. These similarities can confirm, on a broader basis across different communities in different decades, the causes of race riots, and promote a further understanding of race relations in the early twentieth century.

Each city experienced rapid population growth in its black populations preceding their race riots (Rudwick 217). These gains threatened white dominance in economic, political, and social fears, and triggered tensions. Rudwick also claimed that efforts by newly transplanted blacks to improve their social status was perceived by established whites as arrogant assaults (Rudwick 218). Whites at the time could foresee a racial hierarchy that saw only one place for blacks: the bottom. These arrogant assaults included the black attempt to relax in one of Chicago's desegregated beaches or parks that so offended groups like the Ragen Colts. Rudwick noted that each of the three riots was preceded by a series of events that dramatized race frictions; in Chicago this included pre-riot incidents on streetcars, in the stockyards, and on playgrounds (Rudwick 222).

Perhaps even more indicative of contemporary society was the outsized role rumors played in inflaming tensions. Newspapers in each city ran truly absurd rumors. One of the most extreme ran in *The Defender*, which wrote that a mob seized an unidentified young black woman, beat her to death, cut her breasts off and carried them aloft on a pole. If that was not dramatic enough, *The Defender* added that the mob beat her baby's brains out against a telephone pole (CCRR 31). Examples of rumors of this sort were printed in white papers as well, and tended to involve attacks on women. However, nothing even close to this occurred, as only ten women were injured during the Chicago riot, and no women died. Not solely members of the working class, but community leaders and opinion shapers on both sides then held deep-seated biases.

While these rumors indubitably inflamed passions among both whites and blacks, Rudwick points out "A rumor reaches individuals who are already prejudiced and reinforces rather than changes attitudes. Reinforcement tends to raise the level of social tension and violence (Rudwick 228)." In this aspect, the popular press played upon reader prejudices and incited racial violence. The willingness of blacks and whites to believe even the outlandish rumors reveals the deep prejudices each group held against the other, and the total lack of communication between the races, which could have cleared up some of the most egregious charges.

Conclusion

The Red Summer of 1919 without a doubt was a by-product of World War I. Through analyzing the summer's bloody race riots, one can understand how total war empowers oppressed groups, which causes tensions as the oppressed more aggressively lays claim to previously denied basic rights. For black Americans, who contributed greatly to the war effort, this meant no longer blindly submitting to white demands or

violence. For one of the first times, blacks brought the fight to whites and demonstrated their frustration at being relegated to second-class citizens, working second-class jobs, and living in second-class housing. Blacks fought for freedom and democracy abroad, and saw no reason why they should not enjoy it at home.

Two schools of thought fuel debates over the riot. The more facts based approach concludes white anger emerged as a response to increased competition from blacks for everything from housing to political power. Used to seeing blacks as a subservient people, whites, especially the working class who did not want to equate themselves with blacks, did all they could to stop the empowerment of blacks. The other school of thought concludes white violence emerged as a result of the war, which upended traditional ideas of what was “acceptable.” White men felt the need to reassume their social dominance in the face of a destabilized social hierarchy. Because these men, and Americans at large became conditioned to mass killings across the ocean, the prospect of mob violence did not seem so abhorrent. Rumors flew and atrocities were committed during almost two weeks of rioting in Chicago. The riot brought out the worst in both races, as thousands of whites cornered blacks returning from work, and blacks shot indiscriminately at cars driving through the black belt. When it ended, thirty-eight lay dead and more than five-hundred seriously injured, a staggering some brought on by something as insignificant as a black child drifting passed an invisible color barrier. If race relations were not at their low point then, they were close.

Out of this carnage however, a silver lining exists. The militia called in demonstrated exemplary and even-handed conduct towards both blacks and whites, and following the madness, six black and six white citizens came together in the Chicago

Commission on Race Relations to examine the conditions that led to the riot in a 600-page study. Jan Voogd claimed opposition arose as people began to understand the widespread hysterical white racism behind the rioting. Chicago did not immediately experience further racial rioting, despite predictions to the contrary, implying the horrors of the 1919 Race Riot disgusted both white and black Chicagoans from committing such atrocities in the future.

Contributions from both schools of thought, which are embodied in William Tuttle and Jane Voogd's definitive texts, are accurate and beneficial. Voogd claimed Tuttle's work was not truly complete on its own, and she was right. Her work is not complete on its own either. When paired together, the works complete the analysis of the Chicago Race Riot, and demonstrate how both the psychological, intangible feelings and concrete definitive situation can lead groups to take drastic, violent actions. Total warfare, especially of the international kind, causes drastic changes on the home front. It would behoove policymakers to take note of this in the future, as inequality increases in our time, during a state of intense stress at home.

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